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GIRLS IN THE MASTER'S HOUSE:
OF PROTECTION, PATRIARCHY AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR USING THE MASTER'S TOOLS
TO RECONFIGURE STATUTORY RAPE LAW
Michelle Oberman*
INTRODUCTION
After almost a decade of researching, writing, and thinking about
the topic of statutory rape, it is clear to me that everyone approaches
this issue informed by an often-unarticulated paradigmatic vision of
adolescent sex. These paradigms shape the way in which one views
the legitimacy of statutory rape laws. Many different associations are
triggered by the words, "teen sex." Some hear "teen sex" and imagine
Romeo and Juliet, the prom king and queen, or themselves in a rosily-
rendered, pimple-free, back-seat tryst. Others hear "teen sex" and
imagine a high school quarterback pressuring the head cheerleader to
''go all the way." Many people seem to fall somewhere in-between,
thinking "teen sex," and recalling awkwardness, yearning, embarrass-
ment, and the slow, fumbling journey toward pleasure. However, one
constant remains. In a society where half of all teenagers are sexually
active, and where the media is saturated with highly-sexualized images
of young people, the associations with the words "teen sex" do not
tend to be extremely negative. Few people hear "teen sex" and imag-
ine a mother's live-in boyfriend climbing into bed with her thirteen
year-old daughter. Even fewer think of a high school football team
lining up to take turns having intercourse with a drunken ninth grade
girl. Nevertheless, upon hearing about such encounters, virtually no
one is shocked. Stories of sexual abuse and exploitation in teenagers'
sexual encounters are as familiar to us as stories of romance.
Unsurprisingly, people react to the notion of statutory rape with
some skepticism and ambivalence. After all, statutory rape laws os-
tensibly render the act of "consensual" sexual contact a crime. It
seems that many people hear statutory rape and roll their eyes, think-
* I would like to thank Katharine Baker for her friendship, and for always being busy but
always having time. Thanks also to Sarah Alipourian for her stellar research assistance. Por-
tions of this essay also appear in a lengthier article on contemporary patterns in statutory rape
enforcement. See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role
for Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 703, 703-84 (2000).
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ing about the futility of trying to regulate the hormonal urgings of
those caught in the throes of puberty. Virtually no one endorses stat-
utory rape laws without some hesitation or qualification. At the same
time, however, virtually no one recommends abolishing the crime of
statutory rape outright. In spite of the rosy recollections, it seems ob-
vious that young people are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation in
their sexual encounters, and that the law must play some role in regu-
lating and protecting against that abuse.
This essay will explore and attempt to clarify the uneasy role of stat-
utory rape laws in contemporary society. Part II identifies contempo-
rary ambivalence as an outgrowth of the twin set of underlying
purposes. One purpose is protective and unquestionably legitimate,
while the other purpose is patriarchal' and undeniably pernicious.
Each of these purposes has motivated statutory rape laws throughout
common law history. In Part III, I discuss the manner in which these
twin purposes continue to shape contemporary statutory rape laws.
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest a manner for resolving our ambivalence
toward these laws by reclaiming them as legitimately protective, and
reshaping them to address the unique vulnerabilities young people
face in their sexual encounters.
II. THE TWIN RATIONALES FOR STATUTORY RAPE LAWS:
A BRIEF HISTORY
There are good reasons for the ambivalent responses triggered by
statutory rape laws. The history of these laws reveals two intertwined
underlying purposes. First is the uncontroversial impulse to protect
those who are too young to protect themselves from exploitation. The
second purpose, which is far more sinister, is securing male control
over womens' and girls' bodies and sexuality. It is this latter factor,
surprisingly persistent throughout the common law history of statu-
tory rape, which has saddled these laws with negative connotations
and led to considerable ambivalence regarding their relevance to con-
temporary society.
A. Common Law History of Statutory Rape: The Protective
Impulse and the Patriarchal Impulse
First codified into English law in 1275, statutory rape criminalized
1. In this essay, I use the term "patriarchal" to refer to the impulse to secure for men the
possession of women's sexuality.
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sexual relations with females under the age of twelve. 2 This law was
consistent with other laws throughout medieval Europe. For example,
Roman law imposed capital punishment upon anyone who "ravished a
boy or a woman or anyone through force."' 3 The law penalized with
equal severity the seduction of minors which was accomplished by
mere persuasion rather than force. 4 English law also was consistent
with other common law efforts to protect children from exploitation
or harm. For example, at common law, criminal, contract, and tort
law protected minors by limiting the extent to which they could be
held accountable for their actions.
Perhaps the best view that children are not fully equivalent to adults
under the law emanates from criminal law. Early common law provi-
sions governing criminal liability refer to the "rule of sevens."' 5 Ac-
cording to this principle, children under the age of seven are
completely blameless for their actions, even if they are criminal in na-
ture. Children between the ages of seven and fourteen may be held
only partially accountable for their criminal acts, and may not be pun-
ished as severely as adults. Only children over the age of fourteen are
held responsible for their actions, and may be punished. The justifica-
tion underlying the "rule of sevens" is predicated upon a rudimentary
understanding of competence, and the belief that children acquire
competence gradually over the course of their mental development
into adults.6
The laws governing contracts and torts provide closer analogies to
statutory rape laws because they are predicated upon an assessment of
a minor's capacity to consent to an adult activity. The common law
rules governing contracts restrict minors' liability by permitting them
to void or disaffirm their contracts. 7 Minors are considered incapaci-
tated under the law, but the law recognizes that they may nonetheless
engage in commercial transactions. Therefore, the traditional com-
mon law rule protects minors by permitting them to honor their obli-
2. Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. REV.
757, 762 n.35 (1980) (citing the Statute of Westminster 1, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (Eng.): "[T]he
King prohibiteth that none do ravish, nor take away by force, any Maiden within Age.").
3. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 14, 47
(1987).
4. Id. An unsuccessful attempt to seduce a minor was punished only by exile, rather than
death. Id.
5. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.11(a) (2d ed. 1986).
6. Id.
7. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 51 (1926); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI
& JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8-1 (3d ed. 1987).
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gations if they choose to do so, while allowing them to avoid deals that
they later regret.8
In much the same spirit, tort laws long have protected minors under
the laws of battery. For instance, tort law limits minors's capacity to
consent to being touched by another person. As a result, when a doc-
tor treats a minor without first obtaining the minor's parental consent,
such treatment may constitute a battery. 9 Although there are narrow
exceptions to this rule in cases where public policy justifications per-
mit minors to consent, the general principle is that the law limits the
autonomy of young people, barring them from making medical deci-
sions without adult guidance.' 0
Although statutory rape laws may be viewed as consistent with a set
of laws that aims to protect minors from exploitation, at their incep-
tion they served an additional and quite distinct function. These gen-
der-specific laws reflected an effort to protect a father's interest in his
daughter's chastity." Under customary dowry practices, a non-virgin
was considered less desirable for marriage, and therefore less likely to
bring financial reward to her father upon marriage. Indeed, if she
failed to marry, a daughter represented a lifelong financial burden to
her father. From this perspective, statutory rape laws were an out-
growth of biblical precepts, by which virginity was so highly prized
that a man who took a girl's virginity without her father's permission
was considered to have committed a theft against the father. 12 The
father could demand compensation either in the form of payment, or
by forcing the rapist to marry the victim. 13 In sum, historically speak-
8. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.4 (1990). For a fuller discussion of
this issue as it pertains to statutory rape law, see Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women:
Re-Evaluating Modern Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 43-46 (1994).
9. Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (Pa. 1933); see also ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER,
LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 123-24 (2d. ed. 1986).
10. See Oberman, supra note 8, at 46-53 (discussing mature minor laws and cases ranging from
contraception and abortion to sterilization).
11. Rita Eidson explains, "The preferred rationale for protecting only females and punishing
only males has evolved from early exaltation of female chastity and the special need to protect
the 'weaker sex' to more recent arguments that gender-based statutory rape laws are appropriate
because of the unique physical characteristics of females." Eidson, supra note 2, at 761. See also
James McCollum, Constitutional Law - Statutory Rape - Gender-Based-Classification Regarding
Statutory Rape Law is Not Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 25 How. L.J. 341, 355-56 n.147 (1982).
12. See Gen. 34:1-31.
13. FLORENCE RUSH, THE BEST KErr SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 1, 20 (1980).
Rush quotes the Bible:
When a man comes upon a virgin who is not pledged in marriage and forces her to lie
with him and they are discovered, then the man who lies with her shall give the girl's
father fifty pieces of silver and she shall be his wife because he has dishonored her.
Id. (citing Deut. 22:29).
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ing, statutory rape laws aimed to protect the father's property interest
in his daughter, and were an embodiment of the legal perception of
women and girls as "special property in need of special protection.' a4
B. Statutory Rape Law in the United States
Statutory rape laws remained largely unchanged over the course of
the centuries. At the time these laws were absorbed into the Ameri-
can common law system, along with the rest of English common law,
the age of consent was established at ten years of age. Beginning in
the late Nineteenth Century, America witnessed a dramatic rise in the
age of consent, such that, by the start of the Twentieth Century, the
average age of consent was sixteen.15 The campaign to raise the age
of consent, led by the Women's Christian Temperance Union and vari-
ous early feminist leaders, reflects a new variation on the twin themes
of protection and patriarchal control over girls' sexuality.
With regard to the protective impulse, Professor Jane Larson's
chronicle of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century cam-
paigns to raise the age of consent, provides persuasive evidence of the
ideals and aspirations that motivated the feminist reformers:
The age-of-consent initiative represented an aggressive move by
the Women's Christian Temperance Union and its allies to change
male sexual behavior and protect girls and women from laws and
cultural values that threatened their well-being. Like the antiprosti-
tution and social purity movements with which they were closely
linked, age-of-consent reformers saw sexuality as a vehicle of power
that in complex ways kept women subordinated in society .... 16
Larson's history takes issue with those who have seen the age of con-
sent initiative as indicative of Puritanical sexual mores. Rather, her
work demonstrates the powerful feminist vision that guided reformers
into claiming these ostensibly patriarchal statutory rape laws for their
own. Specifically, she documents the manner in which the reformers
reconceived statutory rape law as a mechanism to protect naive young
women from coercive and exploitative sexual encounters.
[R]eformers asserted that the legal definitions of coercion and resis-
tance in the existing law of forcible rape were unrealistic and harsh;
that much so-called "consensual" sexual contact with young women
and girls took place within the family, or in dating, or acquaintance
14. See McCollum, supra note 11, at 348-51.
15. Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last": Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-Cen-
tury America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (1997). This remains the average age of consent
today. There are some jurisdictions adopting higher ages, prohibiting consensual sexual rela-
tions with females under the age of eighteen. Id. at pg. 3, n.9.
16. Id. at 4.
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relationships marked by violence, coercion, pressure, or fraud; that
employers and professionals often abused their economic power or
social authority to solicit sex. 17
In their explicit articulation of the abuses that occurred within the
context of "consensual" sexual relationships with girls, these early
feminists offered a powerful protective justification for statutory rape
laws. This justification did not erase the fact that statutory rape laws
were rooted in male desire to control access to female sexuality.
Rather, the law continued to reflect and embrace both a protective
and a patriarchal function.
During the Twentieth Century, it was more difficult than in the
Thirteenth Century to discern the ways in which statutory rape laws
served to control access to girls' sexuality. Nonetheless, vestiges of
this impulse continued to shape statutory rape laws. Although the
dowry system no longer prevailed, there remained a deep concern
with virginity and out-of-wedlock pregnancy. These issues derive
from the sense that women belong under male control and supervi-
sion, and that once a woman has experienced sexual contact with one
man, she will be less desirable to another.
For example, consider the implications of justifying statutory rape
laws by way of the "treasure theory" of virginity, which grew out of
Sigmund Freud's writings on monogamy and marriage. Freud wrote
that, "[t]he demand that the girl bring with her into marriage with one
man no memory of sexual relations with another is after all nothing
but a logical consequence of the exclusive right of possession over a
woman which is the essence of monogamy."' 8 Thus, according to at
least one scholarly writing, at mid-century, virginity was a woman's
treasure, and one who took it from her was therefore guilty of theft. 19
The reasoning was that the harm to the girl was irreparable. There-
fore, the appropriate remedy was prosecution for statutory rape.20
17. Id.; see also Jui)rrH R. WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY 246 (1991)
(discussing the "social purity" movement and Victorian feminists' concern with protecting young
females from sexual abuse).
18. 4 SIGMUND FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS 217 (James Strachey ed., 1925).
19. See James A. Durham, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and
Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 76 (1952) (describing the "treasure theory"
of statutory rape law whereby sexual indulgence of a girl is a "thing" of social, economic and
personal value). Thus, consent of the girl serves as a form of "social currency" and statutory
rape laws seek to make males who take advantage of "naive" minor girls responsible for the act.
Id.
20. See Larson, supra note 15, at 2. This view of statutory rape law suggests that it operated in
conjunction with the civil laws governing seduction and breach of promise to marry. These laws
provided civil remedies to women who suffered harm in reliance upon promises of marriage. Id.
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The depiction of female sexuality as a perishable resource that
should be preserved and then bartered away in exchange for marriage
is not inherent, as Freud concluded, in monogamy. After all, many
monogamous couples consist of individuals who were sexually active
with others prior to marriage. Rather, this depiction reflects a belief
system under which men acquire women's sexuality through marriage,
and perceive a non-virgin wife as an undesirable acquisition.
The latter assumption is underscored by the traditional common
law defense to statutory rape: promiscuity. This defense, which is en-
forceable in several United States jurisdictions today, provides a com-
plete defense against statutory rape charges for a defendant who can
demonstrate evidence that the victim already was sexually active prior
to his encounter with her.2' This defense reflects a complete disregard
for the exploitative nature of a sexual encounter, and therefore the
protective function of statutory rape laws. While enshrining virginity,
this defense abandons those who have been subjected to prior sexual
abuse and may be in tremendous need of the law's protection.22 In-
deed, a cynic might claim that the defense of promiscuity demon-
strates that the protective norm is a sham, and that in fact, the true
purpose of statutory rape laws is to reinforce the impulse to secure
male control over and access to women's bodies.
This view is amplified in the Michael M. v. Superior Court of So-
noma County case, which is the only United States Supreme Court
case to directly consider the validity of statutory rape statutes.23
Michael M. involved an equal protection challenge to California's stat-
utory rape law, which made it a crime to have sexual contact with
underage girls, but offered no protection to underage boys. There is a
troubling gulf between the story that the victim tells, and the way in
21. See Alston v. Texas, No. 2-90-110-CR, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2366 (Tex. App. 2d Dist.,
Oct. 25, 1991) affd, Alston v. Texas, No. 14-98-00534-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 7429 (Tex.
App. 14th Dist. Oct. 7, 1999). See also William Wayne Kilgarlin & Banks Tarver, The Equal
Rights Amendment: Governmental Action and Individual Liberty, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1545, 1555
n.77 (1990) ("[t]he [promiscuity] defense is available to an adult male accused of statutory rape
of a female."). The Model Penal Code's statutory rape provision preserves this defense, noting
in the commentary that prior sexual promiscuity "rebuts the presumption of naivete and inexpe-
rience" that justifies the criminal nature of statutory rape. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(3), cmt.
4, at 420 (1980). See also Oberman, supra note 8, at 33 (detailing this defense in contemporary
statutory rape jurisprudence).
22. These provisions are particularly troubling in light of research indicating that young peo-
ple who are sexually promiscuous may in fact be survivors of childhood sexual abuse. See Cathe-
rine Stevens-Simon & Susan Reicher, Sexual Abuse, Adolescent Pregnancy, and Child Abuse: A
Developmental Approach to an Intergenerational Cycle, 148 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADO-
LESCENT MED. 23 (Jan. 1994) (noting that a high percentage of girls who experience early teen-
age pregnancy have a history of childhood sexual trauma).
23. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
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which the Court and the State of California, writing in defense of the
law, perceive her story. As other scholars noted, the trial transcript
reveals the victim's description of being coerced into sexual inter-
course.24 The victim consented to kissing, but the defendant pres-
sured her for sex. She repeatedly told the defendant to stop, but the
defendant slugged her in the face several times, after which she per-
mitted him to "do what he wanted. 12 5
In spite of facts indicating force, the defendant was prosecuted for
statutory rape. More startling still, in spite of the evidence of vio-
lence, Justice Blackmun terms the incident as an "unattractive case for
prosecution," given that the victim was not an "unwilling participant
in at least the initial stages of the intimacies that took place. '26 Cali-
fornia also ignored the coercive nature of this encounter, and instead,
defended the statute against the equal protection challenge by claim-
ing that the law served to combat the problem of teenage pregnancy.
The Court accepts this argument, and its opinion rests upon the view
that it is important and desirable to discourage sexual activity among
young people and that boys and girls are not similarly situated when it
comes to sexual encounters. According to the logic of Justice Black-
mun's opinion, by virtue of their biology, girls who engage in sexual
relations with males run the risk of pregnancy. As a result, they have
a natural disincentive when considering whether to have sex. Boys, on
the other hand, risk nothing. Thus, the Supreme Court reasons that
California's decision to protect girls, but not boys, in effect "evens the
score," providing a disincentive for all males who contemplate sexual
relations with an underage girl.27
This somewhat antiquated and perverse cost-benefit approach to
sexuality and statutory rape laws has almost nothing to do with pro-
tecting the vulnerable from abuse. Despite the fact that the case
clearly demonstrated the need to protect girls from physical violence
and coercion in sexual encounters, the opinion overlooks these harms
and embraces statutory rape laws for another reason: underage sex
produces out-of-wedlock babies. As I will discuss in the following sec-
tion, contemporary statutory rape laws and policies demonstrate a dis-
turbingly wide consensus that the purpose of these laws is to combat
teen pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births. Moreover, these events
are viewed as abhorrent, not because they represent a curtailment of a
24. Fran Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387,
415 n.132 (1984). (citing Michael M., 450 U.S. at 484-85).
25. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 484-85 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 485.
27. Id. at 473.
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young mother's autonomy and opportunities for advancement and in-
dependence, but rather, because these events are bad for the
economy. 28
Given the extent to which these justifications, with their commodi-
fied view of female virginity and sexuality, reek of repressive social
norms, it is easy to understand why supporters of women's rights
might feel unenthusiastic about statutory rape laws. It is therefore
unsurprising that, beginning in the 1970s, second wave feminists began
to voice the concern that statutory rape laws perpetuated offensive
gender stereotypes and restricted the sexual autonomy of young
women. 29 It is critical to note, however, that these feminist critiques
reaffirmed the importance of the protective role played by statutory
rape laws. Rather than repudiating statutory rape laws, they called for
the abolition of gender-based distinctions in these laws.30 Even at the
height of the "sexual liberation" movement, feminists understood the
critical importance of statutory rape laws in protecting young people
from sexual coercion and exploitation. 3' For example, Professor Fran
Olsen noted that:
On the one hand, [statutory rape laws] protect females; like laws
against rape, incest, child molestation, and child marriage, statutory
rape laws are a statement of social disapproval of certain forms of
exploitation .... On the other hand, statutory rape laws restrict the
sexual activity of young women and reinforce the double standard
of sexual morality.32
As is evident in this brief history, there is a tension between the
protective and the patriarchal impulses underlying statutory rape laws.
At the start of the Twenty-First Century, there is little evidence to
indicate that this tension will be resolved soon. Rather, as the follow-
ing section illustrates, the past ten years have witnessed a resurgence
28. See infra notes 34-58 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion.
29. Olsen, supra note 24, at 404. See also Eidson, supra note 2, at 761 ("Critical analysis ...
reveals no close correlation between statutory rape laws and female vulnerability to vaginal in-
jury or unwanted pregnancy. Moreover, young males are also in danger of sexual exploitation
by adults .... [Gender] classifications in statutory rape laws are based on pernicious sex-role
stereotypes, rather than physical differences between males and females."); see also McCollum,
supra note 11, at 348-51 (discussing Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980), in which the
court struck down a gender-based statutory rape law because the state had presented no credible
evidence that the gender-based statutory rape law supported the state purpose of preventing
female trauma and teen pregnancy); Alice Susan Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape
Laws: Of Michael M., The Fourteenth Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggres-
sion, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1933, 1992 (1992) (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause does not
permit gender-specific statutory rape laws).
30. Andre-Clark, supra note 29, at 1992.
31. Oberman, supra note 8, at 31-32.
32. Olsen, supra note 24, at 401-02.
20011
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
of interest in statutory rape laws, bolstered in part by the emergence
of a third underlying purpose served by these laws.
III. THE STATUTORY RAPE RENAISSANCE: THE PROTECTIVE AND
THE PATRIARCHAL FUNCTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY
STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
From the end of the Nineteenth Century, when the widely success-
ful campaign to raise the age of sexual consent concluded, until the
1990s, statutory rape laws were quietly, if sporadically, enforced, and
for the most part were ignored by legislators and policymakers. 33 For
example, the series of cases granting minors access to contraception
and related reproductive health care rights never discusses the fact
that, in most jurisdictions, sexual activity with minors remained a vio-
lation of state criminal law. During the 1970s and 1980s, an era
marked by an abundance of rape law scholarship, rape scholars said
little about these laws. Despite an outpouring of public concern about
unwed motherhood and teen pregnancy beginning as early as the
1960s, little was said to tie this concern to statutory rape, until the
mid-1990s.
Suddenly, in the last years of the Twentieth Century, a resurgence
of interest in statutory rape emerged. It is in the policies and rhetoric
surrounding contemporary statutory rape law that one finds the sur-
prisingly familiar incarnations of the patriarchal and protective func-
tions of this law. However, these vestiges of concern over securing
male control over girls' sexuality and protecting girls from harm are
overshadowed by two powerful new functions driving the enforce-
ment of statutory rape laws. The first function relates to the issue of
teenage pregnancy, and the second to the problems inherent in en-
forcing conventional rape laws.
A. Part One: The Teen Pregnancy Predator Factor
In the 1990s, a series of studies indicated that adult men fathered a
startlingly high number of babies born to young teen mothers. For
those acquainted with the problems stemming from teen pregnancy,
the implications of this information were far-reaching. Girls who bear
their first children as teens are less likely to complete high school, less
33. Justice Blackmun's assessment that the Michael M. case was an unattractive one to prose-
cute provides evidence of this laissez-faire attitude toward enforcing statutory rape laws. De-
spite the fact that the victim was underage and therefore clearly protected by California law, and
also despite the evidence of force used to procure her consent indicating that this may have been
a rape, Justice Blackmun and the state of California seemed apologetic and defensive about
enforcing the law in this case. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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likely to marry, less likely to be able to support their families, and
more likely to require public assistance at various points in their lives,
than girls who postpone childbearing until after their teenage years. 34
Thus, at the aggregate level, the men who father these children are
costing states untold millions of dollars.
It was against this backdrop that interest in statutory rape was re-
kindled. After all, this research indicated that many babies born to
underage girls were, in essence, criminal evidence. The act by which
they were conceived was a crime. Federal and state governments
launched policies encouraging the prosecution of statutory rape, par-
ticularly in cases in which an older man had impregnated a teenage
girl.35 Additional emphasis was placed on cases involving wide age
gaps between the victim and perpetrator, and relationships that could
otherwise be construed as prurient, predatory, or a violation of social
norms.
Contemporary statutes and the enforcement priorities established
by federal and state governments reflect both the protective and the
patriarchal impulses that traditionally have informed statutory rape
laws. The age of consent remains relatively high, varying from four-
teen to eighteen across the United States, with the overwhelming ma-
jority of jurisdictions barring sexual contact with a child of either
gender under the age of sixteen. 36
The problem of enforcing statutory rape laws is more complicated
now than it was a century ago, largely due to the fact that over fifty
percent of adolescents are sexually active. 37 As a result, there are po-
tentially millions of statutory rapes every year, and it is difficult to
determine which cases merit prosecution. The focus on cases involv-
ing pregnancy and a wide age discrepancy between victims and perpe-
34. Patricia Donovan, Can Statutory Rape Laws Be Effective In Preventing Adolescent Preg-
nancy?, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 30, 34 (1997).
35. See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statu-
tory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 745 (2000) (describing several of these policies).
36. ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARING ADOLESCENTS
FOR RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 232-33 (2000).
37. ALAN GUITTMACHER INSTITUTE, SEX AND AMERICA'S TEENAGERS (1994) (noting that
eight-two percent of all teenagers are sexually experienced). Among women ages fifteen to
nineteen, fifty-three percent have had sexual intercourse. Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Trends
in 1987 and 1988: Age and Race, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 85, 86 (1992). Other sources report even
higher incidents of sexual activity: three-quarters of American teens having had sex by the time
they reach the age of twenty. Nancy Gibbs, How Should We Teach Our Kids About Sex?, TIME,
May 24, 1993, at 60. Of sexually active girls, sixty-one percent have had multiple partners, up
from thirty-eight percent in 1971, and among fifteen year-olds, one-third of boys and twenty-
seven percent of girls have had sexual intercourse. Id. at 61.
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trators reflects an effort to articulate law enforcement guidelines in
the face of a law that is so widely disobeyed.
These guidelines may be seen as reflective of the traditionally pro-
tective impulse underlying statutory rape laws. States advocating the
vigorous enforcement of statutory rape laws in the event of pregnancy
justify their stance with evidence regarding the diminished life options
for teenage mothers.38 They hope that a high profile campaign against
men who impregnate teenage girls will have a chilling effect on these
relationships, and thus protect girls from unwanted pregnancy. De-
spite studies indicating that, for girls living in poverty, teenage
childbearing has little to do with one's future earning potential, 39 it
seems intuitively sound to hope that, to the extent that a fourteen or
fifteen year old delays childbearing, she will inherit a broader set of
life options as an adult.
The protective impulse also is observed in cases involving wide age
discrepancies. Most states define statutory rape in broad terms,
prohibiting sexual contact with any underage person. However, many
jurisdictions have established enhancements or statutory provisions
that increase the severity of the statutory rape offense according to
the age of the perpetrator, or the age difference between the parties.
For example, Illinois law specifies that the maximum charge applica-
ble to a defendant under the age of seventeen who has been involved
in a consensual sexual relationship with a partner aged nine or older
as "criminal sexual abuse," a misdemeanor.40 However, if the perpe-
trator is seventeen or older, and is at least five years older than the
victim, he has committed aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a class two
felony.41 Although not expressly articulated, the underlying theory
for these increased sanctions presumes that a young person is more
vulnerable to coercion when their sexual partner is considerably older.
Under such circumstances, the law should not tolerate the young per-
son's given consent.
38. Their relationship with the father of their child is not likely to endure. They also face
higher risks than their non-parenting peers of dropping out of school and relying on welfare for
support. See Donovan supra note 34, at 34.
39. See Peter Passell, Economic Scene: When Children Have Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1991, at D2 (referencing work done by Arline Geronimous and Sanders Korenman for the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research). Indeed, some go so far as to suggest that having babies
may be a "sensible response" to poverty, as evidence indicates that poor black women are
healthier and have lower rates of infant mortality while in their teens and early twenties than
they do in their later reproductive years. William Booth, Teenage Pregnancy's Risks Reevalu-
ated; Motherhood Can Be a Rational Response to Poverty, Studies Find, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,
1990, at A8 (citing Arline Geronimous).
40. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-15 (1998).
41. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-16 (1998).
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A critical eye may discern an additional motive behind these en-
forcement strategies: the familiar tendency to use statutory rape laws
as mechanisms for maintaining male control over female sexuality by
circumscribing sexual access to young women. The focus on preg-
nancy is far more complicated than a simple effort to protect young
women from early, unwanted childbearing. In fact, it is apparent that
the state's primary concern with these cases is the harm that teen
mothers cause to the social fabric and, in particular, to the public cof-
fers. State laws and enforcement policies that target statutory rape in
cases of pregnancy reveal the government to be interested in stopping
teenage girls from bearing children because these girls tend to remain
single, and are more likely than their peers to be poor and to require
support from the state.42 Thus, the government is upset not because
girls are being sexually exploited and abused by their partners, but
rather because their partners fail to use contraception, and the result
is that the girls bear children, thereby costing the state money.43
Consider the federal government's recent proclamation that states
and local jurisdictions should aggressively enforce statutory rape
laws. 44 This belief appears within the comprehensive Welfare Reform
Act of 1996, a law that abolishes the former federal program, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children. Just beneath the superficial pro-
tective rationale for enforcing these laws lies the desire to control the
reproductive behavior of poor women, and more particularly, poor
women of color. At least as far back as the mid-1960s, welfare policy
has been obsessed with the reproductive behavior of poor women of
color.45 The policy underlying this new version of welfare is infected
42. It is true that women who bear children as teenagers are disproportionately more likely to
rely upon public assistance, requiring both federal and state revenues for support. See Donovan,
supra note 34, at 34. It is imperative to note, however, that the majority of births to teenage
mothers involve mothers who are eighteen to nineteen years of age, and therefore, technically
speaking, are adults. Thus, statutory rape laws do not even apply to them.
43. Along these lines, it is interesting to consider research suggesting that having children as a
teen has little to do with one's future earning potential. Instead, poverty, not teen pregnancy,
causes decreased earning potentials among most teenage mothers. See Passell, supra note 39, at
D2.
44. See Jodie Levin-Epstein, State TANF Plans: Out-of-Wedlock and Statutory Rape Provi-
SionS, CENTER FOR LAW & SOCIAL POLICY (Aug. 1997) <http://www.clwp.org/pubs/teens/
tanfplnl.html>.
45. Daniel Moynihan's 1965 report on The Negro Family linked the economic desperation of
the "black community" to the inherent pathology of a matriarchal community. DANIEL P. MOY-
NIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 8-10 (1965). Moynihan's
pathologized vision of dominant role of the female in African-American culture came to be
referred to as the "Welfare Queen."
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by the racist image of youthful "welfare queens," who will breed chil-
dren and then become dependant upon the state for support.46
State enforcement patterns provide ample evidence of this impulse
to control and constrict women's lives, reproductive and otherwise.
For instance, consider the former practice of Orange County social
workers. During 1996 and 1997, the county social workers routinely
advised pregnant teenagers who sought out their services that the law
required them to refer their male partners for prosecution under stat-
utory rape laws.47 However, they advised the girls that this referral
would not be made in the event that the girls married the fathers of
their babies. Once this policy became public, embarrassed officials
recanted their position and this advice was suspended.48
A January 1988 California law provides further evidence of the fo-
cus on teen pregnancy and fiscal concerns in enforcing statutory rape
laws. This law precludes new mothers from receiving public assistance
for their infants until they identify their baby's father.49 Ostensibly,
this requirement permits the state to seek the father's child support
contribution. Although the goal of securing child support from "dead-
beat" dads is a laudatory one, in the climate of aggressive enforce-
ment of statutory rape laws, it is obvious that these names also pro-
vide an excellent resource to states attorneys seeking potential
statutory rape defendants. Most certainly, the requirement to name
the father and run the risk that he will be prosecuted deters a number
of girls from seeking public assistance altogether.
The prioritization of cases involving significant age disparity be-
tween victim and perpetrator, likewise, is driven by a subtle impulse to
secure control over sexual access to girls. This concept can be ob-
served, first of all, in the significant extent to which these priorities are
fused, such that the emphasis on cases involving pregnancy is used in
tandem with the emphasis on cases involving significant age disparity.
For example, some states have enhanced their statutory rape laws by
passing new statutes penalizing older men who impregnate underage
46. For a rich critique of welfare policies and the racist imagery that accompanies them, see
Martha Minow, The Day, Berry, and Howard Visiting Scholar: The Welfare of Single Mothers and
Their Children, 26 CONN. L. REV. 817, 836 (1994).
47. See Kelly Connerton, Comment, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The Vic-
timization of Teens By Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REV. 237, 240 (1997).
48. In private discussions with California district attorneys from predominantly rural commu-
nities, several suggested to me that this practice still occurs, particularly when dealing with Mexi-
can-American perpetrators and victims. (Per Comm., The 3Rs Conference, May 2000, Visalia,
Calif.).
49. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Reduced Teen Pregnancy Linked to Rape Enforcement, WASH.
TIMES, April 7, 2000, at A2.
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girls.50 In other states, prosecutors acknowledge that their top priority
in statutory rape enforcement is on cases involving men in their twen-
ties or older who have impregnated teenage girls.51 As such, the focus
on age disparity may reflect the same underlying impulse toward con-
trolling girls reproductive behavior discussed with regard to
pregnancy.
Of course, the tendency to restrict the application of statutory rape
laws to cases involving wide age disparities, regardless of pregnancy,
may speak to a legitimate concern with the imbalance of power in
such relationships. It may be accurate to assume that the wider the
age gap between partners, the greater the chance of coercion. At the
same time, however, it also is clearly true that there is considerable
opportunity for coercion in sexual encounters between peers. As the
Michael M. case powerfully demonstrates, this coercion may be so
commonplace, and so deeply scripted into contemporary norms of
sexual interaction, that it is all but invisible. As such, the exclusive
focus on cases involving wide age disparities may serve as a grossly
underinclusive proxy for estimating the risk of exploitation and coer-
cion in sexual encounters. In short, to the extent that statutory rape
law is enforced predominantly or exclusively in cases involving wide
age disparities, an important category of victims is left unprotected. 52
There is a tangible benefit inherent in the decision to proscribe only
encounters that violate an objective standard of age span, rather than
focusing on the actual terms of consent in adolescent sexual en-
counters. Such a law is much easier to enforce, and convictions are
more readily obtained. Rather than having to consider the nature of
the sexual encounter, evaluating the victim's capacity to protect her-
self and the quality of the consent she gave, the law requires only an
objective determination of the ages of the two parties.
At the same time, however, one might observe that such a policy is
shaped, at least in part, by the familiar practice of securing male con-
trol over access to female sexuality. In essence, age range provisions
50. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04(1)(3) (West 1999).
51. For example, some California counties, such as San Diego, only accept cases for prosecu-
tion when there is a large age difference between the parties and a pregnancy has resulted. See
Rigel Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 SrAN. L.
REV. 463, 493 n.151 (2000).
52. A thorough review of the social science literature regarding minors' vulnerability to coer-
cion and abuse in sexual encounters makes it readily apparent that minors remain vulnerable
well into their teen years. See Oberman, supra note 35 at 703-84 (reviewing this literature). To
the extent that statutory rape law ignores this vulnerability by treating minors as fully capable of
consenting to sex with "peers," it is starkly at odds with the law governing minors in virtually
every other context. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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enable statutory rape laws to function not so much to protect the un-
deraged and vulnerable, as to determine who may have legitimate sex-
ual access to underage and vulnerable sex partners. This view of
statutory rape emerges in stark view in the Model Penal Code.
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (Model Penal
Code) has a lengthy provision governing statutory rape. In section
213.1, the drafters adopt an objective approach to the dilemma of stat-
utory rape laws in a relatively promiscuous society. First, they pro-
pose lowering the age of consent, thereby reclassifying as permissible
a host of sexual encounters currently regarded as illicit. Section 213.1
of the Model Penal Code limits the strict liability version of statutory
rape to victims aged nine and under.5 3 Girls ages ten to fifteen are
protected under a more limited provision, which requires that the ac-
cused be at least four years older than the victim, and that the victim
have no history of promiscuity.54
The official comments to this section justify limiting the law's pro-
tection to girls aged nine by virtue of the fact that ninety-nine percent
of girls in this age range are prepubescent. The commentators assert
that "[t]hose who engage in intercourse with adolescents are neither
as dangerous nor as morally reprehensible as those who engage in
such conduct with young children. In part, this is true because the
post-pubescent child is a more plausible, though certainly not an ac-
ceptable, target of sexual desire .. . . 55
The problems with this construction of statutory rape are numerous.
One problem is the fact that this standard focuses exclusively on polic-
ing male sexual desire, rather than on the needs of the population to
be protected. The entire population of girls, pre- and post-pubescent,
is reduced to sexual objects, and classified according to the commenta-
tors' visions of appropriate sexual desirability. There is no reason to
believe that reaching puberty correlates with a girl's ability to protect
herself from a coercive sexual encounter. This effort to limit the num-
ber of sexual encounters that trigger statutory rape violations may be
efficient, but it is wholly unprincipled, paying no heed to unique vul-
nerabilities of the subject population. As a result, it abandons a signif-
icant number of individuals who, lacking the capacity to protect
themselves, desperately need its protection.
Indeed, the Model Penal Code goes further in its effort to protect
what its drafters perceive as legitimate sexual initiative. It proposes
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980)
54. Id. at § 213.3. Unlike the majority of state laws, the Model Penal Code is gender-specific
and protects only girls.
55. Id..
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eliminating the traditional strict liability construction of the law,
whereby one who has sexual contact with a member of a protected
class is liable, regardless of whether he knew the victim was under-
age.56 Rather, the Model Penal Code proposes eliminating strict lia-
bility as it applies to females over the age of nine but under the age of
sixteen.57 Section 213.6(1) prohibits sexual contact between girls in
this age range and men who are four or more years older. However,
men who engage in sexual activities with these girls are exonerated to
the extent that they can establish that they reasonably believed the
girl was at least sixteen. The Model Penal Code justifies this change
along the same lines of logic articulated with regard to lowering the
age of consent. The Model Penal Code adopts the perspective of the
reasonable perpetrator and notes that it is quite plausible that some
eleven year-old girls might be mistaken for sixteen year-olds. 58 The
implication of this observation is that ten year-old girls who look older
must also be ready for sex, and therefore, undeserving of the law's
protection.59
B. Part Two: The Problem of Acquaintance Rape
Numerous scholars have demonstrated the way in which, for centu-
ries, the law governing rape has served more to protect men from false
56. Several jurisdictions have abolished the strict liability aspect of statutory rape law. See,
e.g., State v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220 (Idaho 1990); see also Bruce R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the
Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1392, 1395 (1986).
57. Interestingly, the drafters intimate that they would have liked to abolish strict liability
altogether, but feared that its retention, in some modest form, was "probably politically unavoid-
able." See supra note 53, §213.1 cmt. 6, at 329.
58. [I]t is at least conceivable that some girls under the age of twelve might act and
appear to be as old as sixteen. Assigning punishment for rape to the male who has
intercourse with such a child under the honest and reasonable misimpression that she is
significantly older marks too great a departure from the general principle that the crim-
inal law should require a subjective basis for liability.
See id. § 213.1 cmt. 6, at 329.
[A] girl of [fifteen] may appear to be [eighteen] or even older. A man who engages
in consensual intercourse in the reasonable belief that his partner has reached her
eighteenth birthday evidences no abnormality, no willingness to take advantage of im-
maturity, no propensity to corruption of minors. In short, he has demonstrated neither
intent nor inclination to violate any of the interests that the law of statutory rape seeks
to protect .... Whether he should be punished depends on a judgment about continu-
ing fornication as a criminal offense, but at least he should not be subject to felony
sanctions for statutory rape.
See id. § 213.6 cmt. 2, at 415.
59. Note that this proposal has not been widely accepted by states, the vast majority of which
retain a strict liability construction of this offense and do not permit a mistake of fact defense.
See Oberman, supra note 35, at 703-84.
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accusations of rape, than to protect women from sexual assault. 60 The
resulting barriers to conviction in cases of rape are notorious. Less
notorious is the way in which statutory rape laws provide prosecutors
with an alternate, easier route to conviction in rape cases. After
briefly summarizing the traditional and contemporary obstacles to
conviction in rape cases, this section will illustrate the way in which
statutory rape laws serve as a back up to the laws penalizing forcible
rape.
Rape victims historically have been "subjected to institutionalized
sexism, which began with their treatment by the police, continued
through the legal system, much influenced by notions of victim precip-
itation, and ended with the acquittal of many de facto rapists. ' '61 Be-
ginning in the 1970s, this status quo was challenged by a coalition of
law reformers, including feminists and law enforcement officials. 62
Nonetheless, despite three decades of activism and law reform, there
is ample evidence that the changes in the common law provisions gov-
erning rape laws have had "little or no effect on the outcomes of rape
cases, or the proportions of rapists who are prosecuted and
convicted. 63
The problem of securing just convictions in rape cases stems at least
in part from the fact that society tends to view rape victims with skep-
ticism, particularly to the extent that they knew their alleged at-
tacker. 64 Added to this problem is the pervasive tendency to excuse
60. David Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1196 (1997).
61. SUZZANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL 17 (1987).
62. See STANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHAN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 402 (5th ed. 1989). Nearly all states have eliminated the requirement that a com-
plainant's testimony be corroborated in instances of forcible rape, although some states retain a
corroboration requirement for statutory rape. See also Ronald J. Berger, The Dimensions of
Rape Reform Legislation, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 329, 334 (1988). As of 1988, more than half the
states continue to allow a cautionary instruction in forcible rape trials. See generally Harriett R.
Galvin, et al., Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second
Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 812-905 (1986); Patricia Searles & Ronald J. Berger, The Current
Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
25, 25-26 (1987).
63. See JEANNE C. MARSH ET AL., RAPE AND THE LIMrTS OF LAW REFORM 21-23 (1982). See
also James P. Levine, Using Jury Verdict Forecasts in Criminal Defense Strategy, 66 JUDICATURE
448, 455 (1983).
64. According to Professors Bryden and Lengnick, two prominent criminologists specializing
in the study of rape:
[A]ctors in the criminal justice system - police, prosecutors, juries, judges and even
victims themselves - tend to be sympathetic towards some types of rape victims but
skeptical towards others. The traditional image of a rapist is a knife-wielding stranger
.... But most rapes are perpetrated by acquaintances of the victim: lovers, dates, co-
workers, neighbors, relatives and so on. The rapist usually does not injure his victim. In
these typical cases, attention usually focuses on the woman's character. If her pre-rape
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rapists by defining their behavior as normal.65
The inevitable result, undisputed by those who study rape, is that it
is difficult to secure convictions in cases involving allegations of ac-
quaintance rape. This problem has particularly grave implications for
girls; first because their youth and relative lack of experience makes
them more vulnerable to coercive sex, and second, because they are
less likely to resist such coercion in a way that the law might recog-
nize. These points are illustrated by an actual case:
On February 28, 1996, S.Q., then 13 years old, arrived home from
school and began doing her homework and watching t.v. in her liv-
ing room. Appellant, Joshua Hemme, age 19, called and wanted her
to come over. She did not want to because she had a lot of home-
work, but he kept asking, so she asked her stepfather if she could go
over to Appellant's house and he said yes. S.Q. had been seeing
Appellant's younger brother Adam and had been to the Hem-
mes[sic] house before. When S.Q. arrived, Appellant took her into
the basement, where the recreation room and Adam's bedroom
were located. At Appellant's request, she sat on the bed. Appel-
lant asked S.Q. if she was scared to have sex. She responded that
she was not scared, but did not really want to. Appellant took off
S.Q.'s clothes and threw them away from the bed. He put his head
between her legs and started to perform oral sex. He pushed S.Q.'s
head to his penis and she performed oral sex on him. Appellant
then got on top of her and had sexual intercourse. He asked her if it
hurt and she said yes, but Appellant kept going.
When they heard Appellant's mother arrive home, S.Q. wiped
the semen off of her leg and got dressed. She went out into the
recreation room area and began to play Nintendo. Appellant began
fingering her vagina and asked her to have sex again. She said no.
Appellant kept asking. Eventually, S.Q. sat on the bed, Appellant
pulled down her pants, and Appellant yelled at her to scoot up and
behavior violated traditional norms of female prudence or morality, many people
blame her instead of the rapist.
See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 60, at 1202-04.
65. For example, Professor Katharine Baker argues that:
Criminally punishing nonconsensual sex has proved difficult ... precisely because the
legal proscription on nonconsensual sex competes with the masculinity norm, biological
theory and popular belief, all of which re-enforce and legitimate the notion that men
crave sex regardless of consent. Given this tension between the law and other well-
established norms, it should come as little surprise that a sizable number of men have
yet to internalize the moral wrong of nonconsensual sex. And even those men who
have internalized the abstract wrong ... can have difficulty concretely identifying what
nonconsensual sex is. This difficulty stems both from well-established sexual behavior
roles that shun explicit communication and from our continuing reluctance to explicitly
discuss, both societally and individually, what consent is. Finally, the constitutional
protections afforded defendants make convictions particularly difficult to secure in
cases, like date rape, in which consent is the only issue.
Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B. U. L. REv. 663, 693-94 (1999).
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put her legs around his neck. Appellant had sexual intercourse with
her again. S.Q. put her clothes on and Appellant took her home in
his van.66
Based upon these facts, Joshua Hemme was tried and convicted of
first degree statutory rape and first degree statutory sodomy.67 He
was neither tried nor convicted of forcible sexual assault, because the
ruling against him was predicated upon his claim that his sexual rela-
tions with S.Q. were consensual.
This case vividly illustrates both the manner in which a girl's rela-
tive inexperience may render her vulnerable to coercion, and also the
way in which her response to such coercion may make it harder to
obtain a rape conviction. First of all, it is important to note the signifi-
cance of S.Q.'s age and gender in making sense of the encounter with
Hemme. S.Q. was studying at home when her boyfriend's nineteen
year-old brother called. As a seventh grader, she could not drive, nor
even leave the house without parental permission. She declined
Hemme's initial request to visit, but ultimately was pestered and ca-
joled into coming over to his house. Once there, he immediately
stated his desire to have sex, and then ignored her bravado-filled re-
sponse that she was not "scared to have sex," but simply "didn't want
to."
A more experienced woman might have avoided this encounter by
insisting on staying at home, or at the very least, by rejecting his de-
mand for sex. Indeed, his demand for sex is plainly predatory and
self-serving. S.Q. and Hemme had virtually no prior relationship, and
no meaningful conversation laid the foundation for a romantic inter-
lude. However, it is unsurprising that S.Q. felt unable to assert herself
against Hemme. When it comes to issues of sexuality, in spite of sev-
eral decades of sexual liberation, including effective contraception and
legalized abortion, this remains a society rife with sexual double-stan-
dards. As in the past, boys and men are expected, if not encouraged,
to engage in sex whenever the opportunity presents itself, and their
reputation is enhanced to the extent that they are seen as sexually
experienced. 68 Girls, on the other hand, have inherited the highly
stigmatized norms governing female sexuality.69 Girls are expected to
66. State v. Hemme, 969 S.W.2d 865, 865-68 (Mo. Ct. Ap. 1998).
67. Id.
68. "Having sex demonstrates one's heterosexuality which demonstrates one's masculinity
and masculinity brings with it the esteem of one's peers." See Baker, supra note 65, at 693 (citing
numerous studies demonstrating the continued vitality of this norm and providing a rich discus-
sion of the impact of this norm on the problem of acquaintance rape).
69. "From their socialization in childhood and adolescence, [boys and girls] develop different
goals related to sexuality .... [Mien are supposed to single-mindedly go after sexual intercourse
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be passive recipients of male sexual attention, and indeed are ex-
pected to work for and be flattered by such attention.70 As a result,
they tend to view sexual pleasure, for the most part, as something that
their partners derive from them, or that they give to their partners.
71
S.Q. may have felt flattered by Hemme's sexual interest in her, but
she also clearly expressed her refusal to have sex with him. One might
argue that her comment that she was not "scared to have sex," but
simply "didn't want to" should suffice as a refusal, making the subse-
quent sexual contact a rape. Certainly, she stated "no" with sufficient
clarity when Hemme asked her consent to a second encounter,
thereby rendering that encounter a rape. Nonetheless, had Hemme
been charged with rape, one can imagine that he would have argued
that there was no force involved, and that S.Q.'s failure to make plain
her opposition to both sexual acts indicated her consent.
Even if these factors are of limited legal relevance, 72 they point to
societal norms that likely would undermine the chances that Hemme
could be convicted for such a rape.73 S.Q. likely would be blamed by a
jury for her failure to object more vigorously to Hemme's advances.
This would be particularly true with regard to the second encounter,
when she returned to her Nintendo game, as opposed to, for example,
becoming hysterical and demanding that Hemme take her home. In-
deed, were a more experienced woman to find herself in S.Q.'s situa-
tion, she might well have left on her own after the first encounter, or
at least have protested more vigorously, rather than silently enduring
the second assault. 74
with a female, regardless of how they do it .... [Wiomen should passively acquiesce or use any
strategy to avoid sexual intercourse." Robin Warshaw & Andrea Parrot, The Contribution of
Sex-Role Socialization to Acquaintance Rape, at 75 in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN
CRIME 104 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991).
70. Oberman, supra note 8, at 67.
71. Id. at 64.
72. Many states have moved away from the traditional common law position requiring the
state to prove force in addition to nonconsensual intercourse in order to secure a conviction.
Instead, the state need only show enough force necessary to accomplish penetration. Indeed,
some states have abandoned the force standard altogether, requiring only a showing that the
penetration was nonconsensual. See Bryden, supra note 64, at 1199; see also WIs. STAT.
§940.225(4) (1999) (defining consent as "words or overt actions by a person who is competent to
give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual
contact.").
73. See Bryden, supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing the barriers to conviction in
acquaintance rape settings).
74. Of course, it is quite possible for adult women to freeze out fear, rather than to vigorously
protest unwanted sex. See e.g., Oberman, supra note 35, at 727-28 (describing a series of ac-
quaintance rape cases in which the adult victims were "actually immobilized with fear" and
therefore could not communicate their nonconsent).
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However, S.Q.'s passivity was consistent with her age. In fact, one
might argue that her self-doubt and insecurity were age appropriate.
Beginning with Carol Gilligan, several scholars have documented the
passivity associated with the onset of adolescence in girls, particularly
in terms of their interactions with men. Research evaluating girls' de-
velopment has found that during adolescence, girls' self-esteem, body
image, academic confidence, and willingness to speak out declines
sharply. Literature describes adolescence as a time during which girls
manifest an increased unwillingness to speak their opinions or voice
their desires. Girls tend to perceive being nice as central to being
feminine, and they connect compliance and cooperation with
''niceness."
In their yearning for femininity, they may become compliant and
cooperative when pressured for sex. In this light, one might readily
understand the recent study which suggests that a considerable pro-
portion of adolescents experience their first sexual intercourse under
coercive conditions. In this study, 2,933 women, ages fifteen to
twenty-four, were asked to estimate the extent to which their first sex-
ual intercourse had been desired.75 The survey used a Likken's scale
of one to ten, in which one meant they really did not want it to hap-
pen, and ten meant they really wanted it to happen. Twenty-five per-
cent of the women reported that, while their first experience with sex
had not been forced, neither had it been wanted. Interestingly, the
younger a woman's age at first intercourse, the more likely she was to
report it as unwanted. Indeed, twenty-four percent of those whose
age at first intercourse was under fourteen described their first inter-
course as completely nonvoluntary. 76
When observed from this vantage, statutory rape laws emerge as an
important tool for prosecutors. Prosecutors may be reluctant to
charge the acquaintance rapist with forcible rape and risk losing the
case because of society's tendency to blame the victim. 77 Rather, the
prosecutor may charge the rapist with statutory rape, (wherein the
only required proof is that there was sexual contact with an underage
victim, and as a result), and thus be assured of a conviction. Statutory
75. Joyce Abma, Anne Driscoll & Kristin Moore, Young Women's Degree of Control Over
First Intercourse: An Exploratory Analysis, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12, 12-18 (1998).
76. Id.
77. For an example of society's tendency to blame the victim, see Baker, supra note 65, at 693-
94. Note that this tendency to blame the victim appears to be a problem in the context of statu-
tory rape, as well. For example, on the program of the annual 3Rs conference, sponsored by the
California Statutory Vertical Rape Prosecution Program, was a workshop session entitled, "Con-
vincing a Judge Your Victim is a Victim" (presented by Rori Robinson, J.D., San Diego County
District Attorney) (May 2000, Visalia, Calif.).
[Vol. 50:799
GIRLS IN THE MASTER'S HOUSE
rape laws therefore provide a de facto stop gap, permitting the law to
punish those who commit the crime of rape, but who might escape
punishment because of deep-seated societal norms that undermine
convictions.
In fact, there are many statutory rape cases that follow this pat-
tern.78 It seems evident that at least one contemporary function of
statutory rape laws is to compensate for the failure of conventional
rape law to provide adequate protection against coercion for the
younger victims of sexual assault. This represents a protective and
critically important aspect of statutory rape law. However, this ele-
ment should not be embraced without serious reservations.
Recall once again S.Q.'s case. A prosecutor might reasonably fear
that, were the case to be tried under current rape laws, the jury would
blame S.Q. for failing to reject Hemme's advances more forcefully,
and the defendant likely would win. In that event, the victim would
have been re-victimized by her ordeal, to no avail. However, if there
were no prosecution at all, S.Q. and Hemme would be permitted to
internalize terrible lessons about the boundaries of permissible sexual
interactions. In particular, S.Q. would learn that sex is about male
sexual gratification, and that the law is willing to view a scenario in
which a thirteen year-old is carried away from a child's video game,
over her explicit verbal opposition, forcibly undressed, and pene-
trated, as consensual sex. Hemme would learn that it is acceptable to
appropriate another human being and to use her explicitly for his own
sexual gratification. In this light, one might sympathize with the pros-
ecution's decision to charge Hemme with statutory rape, for which he
was convicted and sentenced to seven years.
Statutory rape laws provide society with a mechanism for setting
limits around a population that is particularly vulnerable to sexual
predation. Ideally, society aims to provide minors with the chance to
reach adulthood safely, whereupon they will be sufficiently empow-
ered and autonomous to assert their entitlement in order to experi-
ence sexuality on their own terms.
Of course, there is an inherent tradeoff in using statutory rape laws
to punish acquaintance rapists who choose underage victims. Al-
though a conviction might be more easily obtained, the punishment
for statutory rape may be far less severe than is warranted by the
78. The Michael M. case is an obvious illustration of this pattern. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 464.
In addition, a survey of appellate cases revealed ample evidence of this phenomenon. See Ober-
man, supra note 35, at 731-33 (discussing this survey and the relevant case law).
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crime of acquaintance rape.79 This practice is by no means limited to
acquaintance rape, as the entire institution of plea-bargaining reflects
a similar efficiency-based mechanism for obtaining convictions while
avoiding the costs of a trial. However, in the instance of acquaintance
rape, the practice of permitting statutory rape guilty pleas to substi-
tute for acquaintance rape trials, undermines the seriousness of the
offense of forced sex, and thus erodes the legitimacy of laws against
rape. 0
Statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of forcible rape.
Rather, as we have seen, it is an entirely distinct offense, designed to
protect those who willingly consent to sex, but are too young to under-
stand the nature and consequences of their consent. More than half of
all rape victims are under the age of eighteen, and a significant pro-
portion of these are raped by acquaintances. 81 To the extent these
perpetrators are charged with and convicted of statutory rape, rather
than rape, they are getting off easy. Nevertheless, to the extent that
we deprive prosecutors of the option of using statutory rape, we hold
underage victims of acquaintance rape to the standards of adult vic-
tims, standards that assume a sense of maturity and self-possession
that many adolescent girls lack.
This conundrum points to a tightly woven manifestation of both the
protective and the patriarchal functions of statutory rape law. The
protective desire to secure a conviction against one who coerces sex
out of an underage partner is matched by the fact that the convictions
secured are not condemnations of forcible, unwanted sexual en-
counters. Rather, these convictions condemn only the fact that the
79. Statutory rape often is a probationable offense. See e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-15
(1998) (describing criminal sexual abuse as a Class A misdemeanor). But see 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-16 (1998) (describing aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class II felony, punishable
by three to seven years incarceration). Generally speaking, the latter crime requires evidence of
force or threat of force, unless the victim is under twelve or over sixty, or unless there is an age
difference of five or more years or a perpetrator who held a position of trust or authority over
the victim.
80. Indeed, this is precisely what occurred in Hemme. Because he was charged with statutory
rape, rather than rape, the law tacitly accepts that the sexual encounter between Hernme and
S.Q. was consensual, rather than forcible. In Chicago, a public school teacher recently was per-
mitted to plead guilty to battery after the parents of one of his twelve year-old students learned
that he was having intercourse with their daughter. Despite the fact that this could have been
charged as predatory criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony, punishable by six to thirty years
mandatory incarceration (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (1998)). He was sentenced to
fifteen months probation for this offense. Mary A. Mitchell, Law Fails Girl Who Says Teacher
Had Sex With Her, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at 14.
81. The United States Department of Justice estimates the total number of rapes nationwide
annually at 311,110. The number of rapes of girls ages twelve to nineteen is estimated at 124,620
(on file with author).
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girls were underage. As such, statutory rape laws leave intact, and
ultimately legitimate, a system in which it is permissible to lie, trick,
manipulate, pester, and occasionally force another into gratifying
one's sexual needs.82
Social scientists postulate that an individual's early sexual en-
counters have a dramatic impact upon their later experiences of sexu-
ality. In short, one's early sexual experiences form a script from which
one learns the dimensions of pleasure. 83 To the extent that girls' ex-
periences involve manipulative encounters that are primarily about
sexual gratification of their male partners, girls internalize a message
of subordination. Girls learn that their own sexual pleasure is of sec-
ondary importance, and that is it legally permissible for men to lie and
trick girls into consenting to sex. They learn that, to find pleasure in
sex, they must adapt to male sexual initiative, and find pleasure
through giving pleasure. Sex, for such girls, becomes phallocentric
and denigrating, as well as scary. Ultimately, this may be quite conve-
nient for men, as they are permitted to construct heterosexual sexual
encounters on terms that are designed to provide them not only with
sexual gratification, but also with pliant females, who are socialized to
find pleasure in passivity.
IV. RECLAIMING STATUTORY RAPE: CAN WE USE THE MASTER'S
TOOLS TO DISMANTLE THE MASTER'S HOUSE?
Many years ago, Catharine MacKinnon suggested that the power
imbalance between men and women rendered it impossible to discern
the extent to which sex was fully consensual.84 Others soon distorted
MacKinnon's insight by claiming that she believed that there was no
difference between sex and rape; that in fact, all sex was rape.85 Al-
though this is an unfair reading of her argument, it is easy to under-
stand why people reacted this way to her claim. Once one accepts the
fairly obvious proposition that there is a power imbalance between
82. For a thought-provoking discussion of the potential viability of the tort of seduction in
contemporary society, see Jane E. Larson, Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good
Nature 'Deceit': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 375-412 (1993).
83. A particularly upsetting manifestation of this phenomenon is the problem of adolescent
promiscuity in survivors of childhood sexual abuse. The child survivor learns to seek approval
and love by providing others with sexual gratification. As a result, this population has dispropor-
tionately high rates of sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy, as well as an increased likeli-
hood of forming abusive relationships as adults. See Christopher R. Browning & Edward 0.
Laumann, Sexual Contact Between Children and Adults: A Life Course Perspective, 62 AM. Soc.
REV. 540, 550 (1997); Stevens-Simon & Reichert, supra note 22, at 23.
84. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 174 (1989).
85. See Dorothy Roberts, Rape, Violence & Autonomy, 69 CHI. KENT L. REV. 359, 370 (1993)
(discussing this distortion in more detail).
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men and women, and that this power differential permeates sexual
encounters, just as it does virtually all other aspects of social interac-
tion, one can no longer see the bright-line that ostensibly differenti-
ates sex from rape. Once the bright-line distinction between sex and
rape disappears, one must come to terms with the complicated set of
sexual interactions that populate the range of encounters between for-
cible rape and mutually desired, pleasurable, and loving sex.
Many commentators have explored this range of encounters, mak-
ing sense of the reasons behind these sexual interactions, and making
cogent arguments about the extent to which they should be toler-
ated.86 Few, however, have pursued what I perceive as the real thrust,
as it were, behind MacKinnon's initial observation. MacKinnon's cri-
tique was aimed at the manner in which women are socialized, as
young girls, to accept and find pleasure in sexual subordination. The
reason why we cannot be sure whether adult women freely choose to
have sex with men is because, from the time they were infants, the
entire force of their universe is bent upon insuring that they partner
with men. Indeed, it is impossible to know what sexuality would look
like in a world in which girls and boys are raised free from the expec-
tations not only of heterosexuality, but also of the cultural norms that
accompany our particular brand of heterosexuality: male initiation, fe-
male passivity and objectification, phallocentricity, etc. 87
There is a relatively simple explanation for the inattention to this
aspect of the problem of discerning consensual sex. When the focus is
girls, rather than women, even the histrionic claim that all sex is rape
becomes completely uncontroversial. Indeed, this is the precise mean-
ing of statutory rape laws. Until girls reach the statutorily prescribed
age of consent, they are deemed incapable of consenting to sex.
Therefore, any sexual contact with them is, by definition, nonconsen-
sual, and tantamount to rape. In other words, at least insofar as it
concerns underage girls, the law agrees with MacKinnon.
Therefore, one might expect feminists, and particularly those who
understand sexuality to be a reflection of socially constructed norms
favoring the subordination of women, to be outspoken advocates of
statutory rape laws. To date, this has not been true. I believe this is
largely due to the distrust that rightfully emanates from the patriar-
chal history of statutory rape laws. Even the proposal to use them in
86. Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 41, 57 (1993); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phe-
nomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 266-68 (2000).
87. Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & Phil 127, 127-57 (1992) (critically
describing our culture's sexual "scripts").
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the fight to protect girls from subordination calls to mind Audre
Lorde's famous injunction that "The Master's Tools Will Never Dis-
mantle The Master's House." 88
However, I believe that we have little choice but to use these laws.
The underlying problem of socializing girls for subordination in their
sexual encounters, as well as in general, is fundamental and deadly
serious. Ultimately, this socialization process is critical to the replica-
tion of patriarchy. Unless new generations of girls can be sheltered, if
not spared, from the effects of this subordination, their choices and
their power as adults will be as narrowly circumscribed as were those
of their older sisters. It is therefore central to the feminist task to
determine how we should understand, honor, and protect girls' incipi-
ent sexuality.
Statutory rape laws are central to this task, but in order to use them,
girls and women first must reclaim these laws. Toward this end, we
must embrace the protective function of statutory rape laws, which, as
we have seen, is at least as central as the patriarchal function. We
must use the shelter of this protective arm to articulate a coherent
vision of healthy sexual socialization as a critically important adoles-
cent task in which one ideally enjoys room for experimentation, while
at the same time remaining protected from coercion and exploitation.
The task of articulating the exact parameters of this ideal is beyond
the scope of this essay, or indeed, of any one woman's vision of the
ideal. It nonetheless marks a centrally important starting point in re-
constructing statutory rape laws. At present, the laws on the books
deny the reality of sexual socialization by virtue of their over-broad
condemnation of all sexual contact with underage persons. In reality,
however, we have seen that the laws as enforced have a normative
vision of permissible sex and impermissible sexual contact. Sexual en-
counters, even if they are coercive or exploitative, may be permissible
unless there is a wide age range between partners, or a resulting preg-
nancy. These laws must be reconfigured from their cores, beginning
with a central definition of coercion and exploitation. If these laws
are to protect girls' autonomy as they make the transition into women,
they must address and outlaw the lies and manipulative tactics used to
procure sex from girls under conditions that no experienced adult
would tolerate.
In reforming these laws, it is important to remember that the law
can play only a relatively small role in the work of creating a society
88. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUT-
SIDER 110 (1984).
20011
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
that honors girls' sexual autonomy. It will take a far more compre-
hensive approach than the penal system alone is capable of offering to
begin the work of uprooting the offensive way in which girls and boys
are sexually socialized. Obviously, effecting a change in the terms un-
derlying sexual encounters, even if only for minors, will require col-
laborative educational efforts, encompassing parents, schools, the
media, and society at large. To the extent that the law might play a
role in such efforts, there must be a wider range of options for sanc-
tions than we currently utilize. Youthful perpetrators of sexually coer-
cive acts do not necessarily need criminal records. However, they do
need to know that what they do is unacceptable and wrong. This
could be accomplished with a range of sanctions, including suspended
sentences accompanied by a requirement that one complete a proba-
tionary period that is well tailored to learning about the meaning and
consequences of nonvoluntary sex.89
Of course, some might argue that the central purpose of statutory
rape laws has been to secure for men the possession of women's sexu-
ality, and that it is futile to attempt to disaggregate these laws from
their central purpose. As we have seen, from the historical roots of
statutory rape laws in a father's control over sexual access to his
daughter, to the contemporary patterns in law enforcement, the patri-
archal legacy of these laws is powerful.90 Nonetheless, those who
would abolish statutory rape laws in an effort to expose the fallacy of
their promise to protect underage victims would at the same time hold
hostage millions of young girls' lives in this effort. As this essay dem-
onstrates, the simple truth is that the problem with statutory rape laws
has never been too much enforcement, but too little, or misplaced en-
forcement priorities. Therefore, for the sake of girls, and of the world
they might help to create were they permitted to develop as whole
human beings, it is obvious that we must reclaim these laws and re-
work them until they offer meaningful protection to those as yet inca-
pable of protecting themselves.
89. For a fuller description of the law reforms I would propose in reformulating statutory rape
law, see Oberman, supra note 35, at 703-84 (describing a variety of law reforms, and in particu-
lar, a Wisconsin pilot project in which eligible first-time offenders were offered a suspended
sentence upon completion of a class designed to educate offenders about sexuality, autonomy
and sexual violence). Another possibility discussed in the literature, and quite applicable here,
might be the use of shame-based sanctions, designed to communicate a community norm that
condemns exploitative sexual encounters. See Baker, supra note 65, at 698.
90. See supra notes 1-65 and accompanying text for the historical and the contemporary illus-
trations of patriarchal underpinnings of statutory rape law.
[Vol. 50:799
